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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
VESTAL CAUDILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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)
)

NO. 45445
Bonneville County Case No.
CR-2016-7929

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Caudill failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of his unified sentence of six years, with one year fixed, imposed
upon guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine?

Caudill Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
The Idaho State Police were “looking for a blue Freightliner semi truck with two flat bed
trailers hauling hay” that “could be harboring a fugitive” when an officer observed Caudill
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driving “a semi truck, matching the description.” (PSI, pp.26-27, 29. 1) The officer stopped
Caudill for “improper use of [his] turn signal” and subsequently learned that Caudill did not have
a current commercial driver’s license. (PSI, p.27.) The officer deployed his drug detection K9,
and after the K9 alerted on the vehicle, the officer discovered a baggie of methamphetamine in
the center console and a digital scale with methamphetamine residue under the driver’s seat.
(PSI, p.27.)
The state charged Caudill with possession of methamphetamine.

(R., pp.33-34.)

Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, Caudill pled guilty and the parties stipulated to a
unified sentence of six years, with one year fixed. 2 (R., pp.83-88; 4/24/17 Tr., p.5, L.25 – p.6,
L.4; p.7, Ls.4-7; p.9, Ls.10-14.) The district court followed the plea agreement and imposed a
unified sentence of six years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.104-07.) Caudill filed a timely Rule
35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.118-19, 126.)
Caudill filed notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s order denying his Rule 35
motion. (R., pp.127-30.)
“Mindful that an unlawful stop is not mitigating for sentencing purposes,” Caudill
nevertheless asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for
a reduction of sentence because he believes that the traffic stop that led to the discovery of the
methamphetamine in the instant offense was unlawful. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.) There are
two reasons why Caudill’s argument fails. First, Caudill requested the sentence he received and
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “SEALED –
PSI.pdf.”
2
The plea agreement originally provided that Caudill’s sentence would be “suspended for 4
years of probation” (R., p.85); however, “the parties essentially agreed to amend that agreement
so that Mr. Caudill would serve the time” concurrently with a sentence of eight years, with five
years fixed, that he was serving in a separate case (Appellant’s brief, p.3, n.2 (citing 4/24/17 Tr.,
p.7, Ls.4-17; p.8, L.13 – p.9, L.8; p.12, Ls.11-13)).
2

is therefore precluded by the invited error doctrine from challenging the sentence on appeal.
Second, even if this Court reviews the merits of Caudill’s claim, he has failed to establish an
abuse of discretion in the denial of his Rule 35 request for leniency.
A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining that a ruling or
action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was error. State v.
Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). The purpose of the invited error
doctrine is to prevent a party who “caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court”
to take a particular action from “later challenging that decision on appeal.” State v. Blake, 133
Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999). This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well
as to rulings during trial. State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App.
1990).
On appeal, Caudill acknowledges that, at sentencing, he “asked the district court to
follow the plea agreement and sentence [him] to a unified sentence of six years, with one year
fixed,” and that the district court granted his request and imposed that very sentence.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.2-3.) Because Caudill received the sentence he requested at sentencing, he
cannot claim on appeal that it is excessive or that the district court abused its discretion by
declining to reduce his sentence. Therefore, Caudill’s claim of an abuse of sentencing discretion
is barred by the doctrine of invited error.
Even if this Court considers the merits of Caudill’s claim, he has still failed to establish
an abuse of discretion. In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the
Idaho Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a
sentence.” The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35 motion is
merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. Thus, “[w]hen
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presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of
new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” Id. Absent the presentation of new evidence, “[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule
35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence.” Id. Accord State v.
Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008).
Caudill did not appeal the judgment of conviction in this case, and he did not present any
new information in support of his Rule 35 request for sentence reduction. He merely stated that
officers “pulled over the wrong vehicle” when they stopped him in the instant offense because
the vehicle for which officers were looking was described as a blue Freightliner semi-truck with
hay in the flatbed, and the flatbed of Caudill’s blue Freightliner semi-truck was empty –
information that was before the district court at the time of sentencing. (9/5/17 Tr., p.15, Ls.1619; p.17, Ls.6-9; PSI, pp.26-27, 29-30.) On appeal, Caudill acknowledges that “an unlawful stop
is not mitigating for sentencing purposes.” (Appellant’s brief, p.4.) In denying Caudill’s Rule
35 motion, the district court stated, “I understand what you’re saying, Mr. Caudill, but … that’s a
kind of a different motion and a different procedure rather than what the sentence was in this
case based upon the joint plea agreement based upon a plea of guilty to the charge ….” (9/5/17
Tr., p.17, Ls.21-25.) Indeed, Caudill’s claim of defects in the underlying proceedings does not
fall within the scope of a Rule 35 motion. See, e.g., State v. McDonald, 130 Idaho 963, 965, 950
P.2d 1302, 1304 (Ct. App. 1997) (“[Rule 35] cannot be used as the procedural mechanism to
attack the validity of the underlying conviction.”). Because Caudill presented no new evidence
in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion that his sentence was
excessive. Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for
reversal of the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order denying
Caudill’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 19th day of March, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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Paralegal
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